THE A.M.A. AND THE SUPPLY OF PHYSICIANS*
RBEN A. Kssmi
INTRODUCTION

This paper deals with two related topics: first, the role of the American Medical
Association (AMA) in determining the rate of output of physicians and, as a consequence, the current stock of physicians, and, second, the role of organized medicine
-that is, the AMA-in circumscribing the choice of contractual relationships between physicians and their patients. Because it is my thesis that the famous Flexner
report of igio constituted the key to achieving control over the output of physicians
by the AMA, a substantial portion of this paper is devoted to this report and its
implications for understanding how our society produces physicians.
The history of public intervention in the market for medical services can be conveniently divided into two periods. The earlier begins with the publication of the
Flexner report and ends with the conclusion of World War II. During this period,
public intervention in the market for medical services had its principal effect on the
supply of physicians' services. Organized medicine-again, the AMA-, using powers
delegated by state governments, reduced the output of doctors by making the graduates of some medical schools ineligible to be examined for licensure and by reducing
the output of schools that continued to produce eligible graduates. This led to the
demise of the schools producing ineligible graduates, since training doctors was their
raison d'tre. For the surviving schools, their costs of producing doctors increased
enormously.
The later period, which begins with the end of World War II and continues to
the present moment, may be characterized as a period when governmental intervention, through programs such as Kerr-Mills, Medicaid, and Medicare, operated to
increase the demand for the services of doctors.
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The Flexner report has been hailed, even by critics of the AMA, as an action
of the AMA in the public interest. For example, Dr. John H. Knowles has said,
At the turn of the century, the AMA stood at the forefront of progressive
thinking and socially responsible action. Its members had been leaders in forming

0

Editor's Note: This article was prepared prior to the appearance of CARNEGm CoMmussIoN oN HIG R
EDucATION, REPORT ON MEDICAL EDUCATION (1970), which deals with some of the same subject matter
and reaches similar conclusions.
t-Professor of Business Economics, Graduate School of Business and Center for Health Administration
Studies, University of Chicago.
The following, who either were or are students at the Center for Health Administration Studies of the
University of Chicago, helped in the preparation of this paper: Charles Phelps, Duncan Neuhauser, Jerome
Hammerman, and Robert Lurie.

268

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

much-needed public health departments in the States during the last half of the
nineteenth century. It formed a Council on Medical Education in 1904 and immediately began an investigation of proprietary medical schools. Because of its
success in exposing intolerable conditions in these schools, the Carnegie Foundation,
at the AMA's request, commissioned Abraham Flexner to study the national scene.
His report in igo drove proprietary interests out of medical education, established
it as a full university function with standards for admission, curriculum development, and clinical teaching. Our present system of medical education, essentially
unchanged since the Flexner (and AMA) revolution-and acknowledging its current defects-was accomplished through the work of the AMA. Surely this contribution was and is one of its finest in the public interest.1
This interpretation of history is challenged here; an alternative interpretation is that
the "success" of the FPexner-AMA revolution accounts for the current scarcity of
physicians.
The decline in the number of medical schools and in the output of physicians
as a consequence of the Flexner report has been amply documented. Shryock interprets the history of medical education during the period from x87o to x91o as a
struggle between existing practitioners, represented by the AMA, and medical educators for control over the output of doctors and hence over the medical schools
themselves. 2 The victor in this struggle was the AMA, and its most powerful
weapon in the battle was the Flexner report on medical schools, which was undertaken and published under the aegis of the prestigious Carnegie Foundation.8 This
report discredited many medical schools and was instrumental in establishing the
AMA as the arbiter of which schools could have their graduates sit for state
licensure examinations. Graduation from a class A medical school, with the ratings
determined by a subdivision of the AMA, became a prerequisite for licensure.4 This
victory completed the long campaign of the AMA against medical educators. The
first triumph in this campaign was the elimination of the power of medical schools
to license their own graduates.
It is the thesis of this essay that Flexner and the Carnegie Foundation were, to
use the language of the Left of the 193os, "dupes of the interests." In other words,
they unwittingly served the highly parochial interests of organized medicine. Flexner's work consisted of a grand inspection tour of the medical schools of the timesome were evaluated in an afternoon-to determine how they produced their outputs. His model of how doctors should be produced was the medical school of
Johns Hopkins University.8 There was no attempt to evaluate the outputs of medical
'Knowles, Where Doctors Fail, SATUnDAY PEvraw, Aug. 22, 197o, at 21, 22.
2 IL SHRYocK, MEDicAL LICENSING IN AMEmmcA: 1650-965, at 92-93, 08-O9, 13 (1967).
*A. FLEXNER, MEDIcAL EDUcATION IN THE UNITED STATEs AND CANADA (i910)

[hereinafter cited as

FLExNER REPORT].

'The power of the AMA over medical schools is described by H. MARGULIES & L. BLOCX, FOREION
MEDicAL GRADuATEs IN THE UN ED STATEs 25-27, 44-45 (1969).
'This is brought out in Flexner's autobiography. See A. FLFxNER, ATrroBIOGRAPY 74 (rev. ed.
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schools; there was no investigation of what their graduates could or could not doy
Nor was there any discussion of what a graduate of a medical school should be able
to do, or of the possibility of raising standards of medical education through stiff
licensure examinations. The entire burden of improving standards was to be borne
by changes in how doctors should be produced-that is, how students, facilities, and
faculty ought to be combined to generate physicians. He implicitly ruled out all
production functions other than the one he observed at Johns Hopkins.
It is a paradox that a group ostensibly so concerned as the AMA with the qualifications of doctors for the practice of medicine failed to be disturbed by Flexner's lack
of qualifications for the task he undertook. Flexner was neither a physician nor a
scientist, and had no qualifications as a medical educator. He had an undergraduate
degree in arts from Johns Hopkins and had operated a small, private, and apparently
profitable preparatory school in Louisville for fifteen years. It is unlikely, if not inconceivable, that he would have been accepted in a court of law as an expert
witness in the field of medical education before he undertook his study
Virtually all the work Flexner undertook had already been done by the AMA,
and N. P. Colwell, the secretary of the AMA's Council on Medical Education at
the time, accompanied Flexner in some of his inspections and provided him with
the results of the AMA's previous labors Indeed Flexner spent many hours at the
Chicago headquarters of the AMA. It was clearly recognized that Flexner, or more
properly the Carnegie Foundation, had a comparative advantage over the AMA in
publishing an attack on the medical schools of the time. The Carnegie Foundation
was comparatively invulnerable to a self-interest charge. "[I]f we could obtain the
publication and approval of our work by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, it would assist materially in securing the results we were attempting to bring about."9
As a result of the implementation of the Flexner report, medical education
became considerably more expensive and exhibited relatively little variation from
school to school. To this day, there probably is less variation in medical training
than in almost any other field. The implementation of Flexner's recommendations
made medical schools as alike as peas in a pod. In their first year, medical students
almost invariably took anatomy, biochemistry, and physiology; in the second, microbiology, pathology, and pharmacology. The next two years consisted of supervised
contacts with patients in the major clinical specialties of a teaching hospital. Often
0
this training pattern was written into state laws.'
" Significantly, Flexner's brother, who became a very distinguished physician, graduated from one of

the schools put out of business.
7 See A. FLEXNER, supra note 5, at 78, 79.
'The AMA's Council on Medical Education rated 82 schools class A in x9o6. Flexner rated only 72
schools that high a few years later. See Dodds, Adventures in Medical Education, 32 J. MrD. Enuc. 78z,
787-88 (1957).
0

Bevan, Cooperation in Medical Education and Medical Service, go J.A.M.A. 1173, 1175 (1928).
The Crisis in Medical Services and Medical Education 7, report on an exploratory conference
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The implementation of the Flexner report has, until relatively recently, sharply
reduced experimentation in the training of physicians. As a result, there was a
hiatus of over forty years in the search for better curricula and teaching methods, and
in the utilization of the talents of scientists outside of medical schools for the training
of physicians. It is only in recent years, in the decade of the i96 os, that the fetters
imposed by the Flexner report have been loosened. As a consequence, medical
education is currently in a state of flux, and the number of electives open to
medical students has increased enormously. In addition, the economic cost of
acquiring the M) degree has started to decrease, because some medical schools have
relaxed their requirements for a bachelor's degree as a condition for admission.
Moreover, as a result of student pressure, medical schools have increased their
willingness to substitute undergraduate courses for preclinical courses.
A little recognized consequence of the Flexner report was its effect on the frequency of Negro doctors in the population and on the number of Negro medical
schools. As a result of the AMA's and Flexner's endeavors, the number of medical
schools declined from 162 in 19o6 to sixty-nine in 1944, while the number of Negro
medical schools went from seven to two. Moreover, the number of students admitted
to the surviving schools decreased. Flexner's views on medical education for Negroes
were patronizing: "A well-taught negro sanitarian will be immensely useful; an
essentially untrained negro wearing an M.D. degree is dangerous"; "the practice of
the negro doctor will be limited to his own race . . . ."" According to census
figures, the frequency of Negro physicians among all physicians increased sharply
from i9oo to i9io (from 1.3 per cent to 2.0 per cent) and leveled off afterwards. In
the absence of Flexner's, or more properly the AMA's, repression of medical schools,
one would have expected the frequency of Negro physicians to rise as their educational disadvantages were overcome. The problem of obtaining medical education
for Negroes was intensified by the development of intern and residency programs,
because many hospitals refused to hire Negroes for their house staffs for purely
racial reasons. The usual argument was that white patients, particularly obstetrical
patients, do not wish to be treated by Negro doctors."
Not by chance, 191o was also a high water mark for women physicians. "By
1940 the number of women physicians (including osteopaths) was 8,8io, which was
somewhat smaller than it had been at a high point in I9Io.'"13
For those interested in the motive of the AMA in seeking control over medical
schools, an unambiguous answer was provided by the former head of the AMA's
Council on Medical Education:
sponsored by the Commonwealth Fund and the Carnegie Corporation of N.Y., Fort Lauderdale, Fla.,
Feb. 1966.
" FLEXNEIR REPoRT, supra note 3, at 18o.
2 Often Negro medical students took their first two years of training in Northern medical schools
and then went South for their clinical training.
"sShryock, Women in American Medidne, 5 J. Am. MED. WOMFN's Ass'N 371, 377 (195o).
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In this rapid elevation of the standard of medical education .. with the reduction
of the number of medical schools from i6o to eighty, there occurred a marked
reduction in the number of medical students and medical graduates. We had anticipated this and felt that this was a desirable thing. We had ... a great oversupply
of poor mediocre practitioners. 14
According to Shryock,
Competing within a free economy they observed that the scientific motive for
educational reform coincided with their own professional ambitions. They became
increasingly aware that too many schools were turning out too many graduates to
make practice profitable. 15
The advent of licensure and the closure of the medical schools that failed to

meet AMA standards was of course justified as a measure to protect the public from
the ministrations of unqualified or incompetent physicians. '

But when higher

standards were imposed, there was no immediate change in quality since the graduates of those medical schools that were put out of business continued to practice.
As is commonplace whenever licensure is imposed upon a previously unlicensed

activity or new standards are imposed, there were no substantial changes in the
quality of the outstanding inventory of practitioners. Grandfather clauses pro-

tected the rights of existing physicians to continue to practice medicine regardless of
the adequacy of their training. Hence the effects of the change in training standards

for physicians could not have been realized for many years after Flexner's labors.
The restriction on opportunities to study medicine in this country were particularly oppressive for Jews and Negroes.' 7 There was a large decrease in demand

for medical services caused by the great depression of the I93Os. As a result, there
was a cutback in admissions to medical schools, with Negroes and Jews bearing a
disproportionate share of the reduction.' Probably females also bore a dispro-

portionate share of the reduction in admissions.' 9
11 Bevan, supra note 9, at 1176.
R. SHRYocK, supra note 2, at 57 (footnote omitted).
Lawrence Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing z89o-zgzo: A Legal and
Sodal Study, 53 CaunF. L. REv. 487, 493 et seq. (x965), explains the growth in licensure during this
period as being largely economic, a function of the desire to restrict entry. He uses the same explanation
for physicians and barbers. By contrast, Milton Friedman, Kuznets, and Rayack view the AMA.'s shutting
down of medical schools as having the unintended effect of restricting entry as well as the desired
effect of increasing standards. See M. Frxanas & S. KZNETS, INcoMM FROM INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL
MEDIcINE: THE EcoNoMacs op
PRAarscE 11-x2 (1954); E. RAYACK, PRopEssioNA. PowE AND Aamea
T
Aarm.m
MEDIcA.L AssocAToN 70 (1967).
'7 For an explanation of why this should occur, see Alchian & Kessel, Competition, Monopoly, and
the Pursuit of Money, in Aspac'rs op LtAEo EcoNoMcs 157 (National Bureau of Economic Research,
x962). It would be interesting to see if there was an increase in the frequency of children of physicians
being admitted to medical school.
" See Goldberg, Jews in the Medical Profession-A National Survey, I JEwisH Soc. S'TroDas 332
(1939); J. B-uaow, AMA: VoicE oF AmumcAc MaiCmE 187 (1963). For slightly different periods both
groups were cut back by about 30% while the over-all reduction in students admitted was about 17%.
It also became considerably more dificult for graduates of foreign medical schools to win licensure in the
United States during the 1930s.
'9 If one allows for a secular trend upwards in the frequency of females among medical students, the
'
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As a result of the Flexner report and the restrictions of opportunities for medical
education in this country, foreign medical schools, particularly in the late i93os,
were deluged by American applicants. If one divides graduate training in United
States institutions into the categories of business administration, agriculture, education, engineering, physical and natural sciences, economics, and medicine, then
foreign enrollments in American institutions exceed American enrollments in
foreign institutions by a wide margin for all fields but one-medicine. Americans studying abroad range from one-fourth to one-thirtieth of foreigners studying in the United States for six of the seven categories. But the ratio of Americans studying medicine abroad to foreigners studying medicine in the United States
exceeded three to one for the year 19660 ° Apparently the restriction of opportunities
in this country continues to affect the number of Americans studying medicine
abroad.
II
EDUCATIONAL COSTS AND PHYSICIANS' FEES

It is of course a well-known axiom that an increase in quality requires an increase

in price. And an increase in price implies an increase in efforts to economize on a
resource that has become more scarce. 21 Hence, an increase in quality implies a
greater effort to economize on physicians' services. What this means specifically is
that people tend to substitute self-diagnosis and treatment for the services of a
physician. This tendency manifests itself at the onset of an illness or suspected
illness, and going to a physician is deferred until the symptoms become alarming.
Consequently, increasing the quality of physicians does not necessarily imply that
the quality of medical care that the public as a whole receives also increases, since
the public receives a mixture of professional attention and self-treatment.
The foregoing argument about the effect of quality improvements on price has
been countered with the argument that higher standards protect all of the public.
Those too poor "to afford" good medical care, so the argument runs, would and do
1930s appear to be overrepresented among observations below the trend line. The relevant numbers
appear
in C. LOPATE, WormEN IN MEDICINE app. 1, at 193 (1968).
2
°See INsrITITE ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, OPEN DooRs (1967); AMERICAN COUNCIL ON
HIGHER EDUCATION, A FACT Boor ON HIGHER EDUCATION (1967).

One source reports that in the late

1930s 90% of the Americans studying medicine abroad were Jewish. See Goldberg, supra note x8, at
332.2 1

Flexner was aware of this argument and countered

it with the proposition that the country
was encumbered with too many doctors. He decided, aided by reasoning not apparent to this reader,
what was the "right" ratio of physicians to population. Given this constant, he inferred that the, output of
physicians ought to be reduced and that medical schools were "frequently set up regardless of opportunity
or need." He also believed that it was necessary to drive low quality doctors out of business if the market
was to support high quality doctors. This position was buttressed by an erroneous interpretation of
Gresham's law. See FLE-xNER REPORT, supra note 3, at 6, 14. Chapter 1 of the report deals with the
economics of the medical profession.
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receive it free. Money is not a barrier to receiving medical services. Since these
views have received wide acceptance by both the public and economists, they deserve
attention.
Both economists and noneconomists have inferred, incorrectly, that if care is
provided by physicians at no out-of-pocket or pecuniary cost to the patient, an act of
charity has occurred. They have forgotten that transactions at a zero price can
be economically profitable for everyone involved. 22 Most of the "free" care that was
traditionally provided by the medical profession fell into three categories: (i) work
done by neophytes, particularly in the surgical specialties, who want to develop
their skills and therefore require practice; (2) services of experienced physicians
in free clinics who wish to develop new skills or maintain existing skills so they
can better serve their private, paying patients; and (3) services to maintain staff and
medical appointments which are of great value financially. The advent of Medicare
has reduced the availability of "charity" patients used as teaching material, and has
led to readjustments in training procedures, particularly for residents."
To see that the free care argument can not be taken seriously, all one needs to do
is examine the relationship of infant mortality to income. The infant mortality rate
is highly sensitive to the absence or presence of medical care, particularly prenatal
care. Clearly Negroes have lower incomes and higher infant mortality rates than
whites, for they have not been provided with enough free care to offset the effects
of income differences. 24 Moreover, infant mortality rates in the United States do
not compare favorably with a number of European countries, including some that
use midwives extensively. Charity, with or without quotation marks, can not be
regarded as an important means for offsetting the effects of restriction on entry
into the practice of medicine.
The argument that restriction on entry and licensure has raised standards of
medical practice has great appeal and acceptance. Unfortunately there does not
appear to be any empirical study available to support this view, and it is striking
that organized medicine has not investigated the effects of licensure on the quality
of care of the community. The usual statement one sees is that Americans have the
best medical care in the world-if the contention were "the most expensive," it
would probably be easier to buttress.
"'My article, Kessel, Price Discrimination in Medicine, i J. LAw & ECON. 2o, 23 et seq. (1958),
contains this error, and Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am.
ECON. REV. 941, 957 (1963), follows me in it.
2

CITZENS COMNISSION ON GRADUATE MEDIc:AL EDUCATION, THE GRADUATE EDUCATION oF PHYSICIANS

75, 77 (1966). This document is also known as the Millis Report.
" Evidence showing a relationship between medical care and health status, setting aside public health
measures dealing with infectious diseases, is difficult to obtain even for infant mortality. Diet plays an
important role in preventing infant mortality, and dietary information is typically provided by physicians
as part of prenatal care. For those unwilling to accept the foregoing argument, it is relevant to point
out that access to the medical establishment does vary with income. Therefore either the well-to-do
"need" more medical care than the poor, or free care does not offset the effect of income differences.
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III
RESTRICTION OF ENTRY AND QUALITY OF CAE

Many distinguished writers, some in the field of political economy, have argued
for free entry into the practice of medicine-for giving the public freedom to choose
anyone as a physician without constraints imposed by the state. This view appears
in the famous letter of Adam Smith to CullenF5 and in a letter of William James to
his fellow physicians in Boston 6 It is also Milton Friedman's position' r This
view was expressed as well by Samuel Clemens as by anyone. When he found
out that MDs were trying to put osteopaths out of business in his state, he said,
I don't know that I cared much about these osteopaths until I heard you were
going to drive them out of the State; but since I heard that I haven't been able to
sleep.
Now, what I contend is that my body is my own, at least I have always so regarded it. 8 If I do harm through my experimenting with it, it is I who suffer, not
2
the State.
By using licensure as a barrier to entry, our society has to a large extent abandoned freedom of choice of physicians. It is pertinent to turn to an examination
of this professed policy of protecting the public from making poor choices of
physicians. How consistent has organized medicine been in adhering to the implications of its arguments about protecting the public from incompetent doctors?
(i) There is a substantial body of evidence that there has been discrimination
in terms of race, creed, and color in admission to medical schools2 This discrimination became especially severe when there was a cutback in the production
of doctors in the mid-i9 3 os as a result of the onset of the great depression. Negroes
and Jews (and possibly women) seem to have borne a disproportionate share of the
reduction in admissions to medical schools. 0 Clearly the cutback in output can not
be justified as an effort to maintain quality of medical care, since discrimination in
terms of race, creed, and color reduces the quality of student inputs into medical
schools.
(2) When higher standards were instituted, they were not made applicable to
existing practitioners. Hence, it was future and not current medical problems that
would benefit from any improvement of standards. Yet, so far as the public is
" See Guttmacher, The Views of Adam Smith on Medical Education, 47 Bu.L. JoHNs HoMNs
Hosp. 164, 171 (1930).
26 2 H. J'amEs, Tim LExrEs oF Wsutw
Jaams 66 at seq. (X920).
ITM. Fm mAN.,CAPA.smsAN FREEDoM 149 (1962).
8

" Quoted in Andrews, Medical Practice and the Law, 3x FoRum 542, 547 (1901).

29 2 REPORT OF THE P EsIDENT's COmuSSION ON HIHrmm EDuCA'TON 38 at seq. (947).

The Commission

concluded that a substantial part of the responsibility for the discriminatory practices of medical schools
belongs to the professional associations.
" One of the ironies surrounding Flexner's study is the fact that, because of his work in 191o, in
the 293os Jews from family circumstances similar to his own-immigrant parents, poverty, high cducation aspirations-were unable to get into medical schools.
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concerned, there are no grounds for distinguishing between mistreatment by recent

as distinguished from less recent graduates of medical schools.
(3) There is no re-examination procedure for doctors. Once a doctor wins a
license to practice, it is almost never revoked unless he is convicted of law-breaking.
It is pertinent to ask why holders of automobile drivers' licenses are subject to
re-examination and holders of licenses to practice medicine are not. Is medicine less
important? Why are commercial airline pilots subject to re-examination but not

physicians? Clearly, to be consistent in one's concern about maintaining high
quality, there should be periodic re-examination of physicians with recertification to
insure that physicians keep current on what constitutes good practice. 1
(4) Politics has been intertwined with decisions that should be based on quality
considerations alone. An important instance has been the requirement that a doctor
be a member of his county medical society in order to qualify for membership in a
specialty board. Obviously membership in the AMA has nothing to do with a

doctor's qualifications for membership on a specialty board3 2
(5) Doctors run most hospitals, in the sense that they have de facto control over
staff appointments. For most medical specialists, being on the staff of a hospital is
an imperative for successful practice. Yet appointment decisions are not based
solely on considerations of skill and talent, but are similar to admissions procedures

to a country club-race, religion, family, type of practice, and so forth are often
importantPs
(6) Within the medical profession there exists great internal solidarity and cohesion. This is much stronger in medicine than in a field characterized by free entry
such as the profession of economics. As a consequence, there tends to be a closed loop
of referrals of patients from one doctor to another, and patients are unable to form
effective coalitions with doctors in buying the services of other doctors. It is very
difficult to obtain the judgment of the profession about the relative ranking of doctors
in particular fields and parts of the country. The difficulty of obtaining doctors to
testify as expert witnesses for plaintiffs in malpractice suits is so widespread that

lawyers assert that a "conspiracy of silence" exists. For these reasons, the incentive
to produce quality work and to develop an outstanding reputation is not as strong
as it would be in a world in which such information could be more easily obtained.
For all these reasons, it is difficult to take very seriously the protestations of
the medical profession that its concern in establishing control over medical schools
was quality. Improvements in the quality of the output of medical schools probably
"1Driving proprietary interests out of medical education is alleged to be one of Flexner's great achievements. See Knowles, supra note 1, at 22. This is factually incorrect. They have been driven out of
pre-MD training, but in fact they play an important role in the training of the practicing physician. The
detail men of pharmaceutical companies provide the continuing education of many practicing physicians.
See The Crisis in Medical Services and Medical Education, supra note lo, at 12.
" Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine,
63 YL.J. 938, 952 (1954).
88
'd.
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did occur. Yet, if the experience of law schools is relevant, improvements undoubtedly would have occurred without the efforts of organized medicine. It was
this promised improvement in the quality of the output that "sold" the public and/or
legislators on giving powers to regulate output to organized medicine. Economic
gains to the medical profession resulting from restriction on output constitutes an
explanation of the shutting down of medical schools with fewer loose ends than the
"desire to raise standards" explanation.
However, even if one prefers to reject the foregoing explanation and to accept
the view that those responsible for restricting the output of physicians were not
economically motivated, one can hardly deny that the output of doctors has in fact
been unresponsive to market forces. The increases in demand for medical services,
particularly those brought about by Medicare and Medicaid, have had relatively
little impact upon the output of doctors by American medical schools. As a consequence, the prices of physicians' services have risen dramatically, and there has
been a shift of medical resources away from the population at large and towards the
beneficiaries of Medicare and Medicaid. 34 This analysis suggests that the proposed
measures to increase the demand for medical care, such as the extension of Medicare
to the under-sixty-five population, would not increase the availability of physicians
to the population generally and, if anything, would be more likely to reduce than
increase availability.
IV
INNOVATIONS IN MEDIcAL EDUCATION

The current problem of the relative unavailability of physicians had its origin
in the victory of organized medicine over educators in their battle for control of
medical education. Educators have a much stronger interest in producing doctors
than has organized medicine and, if given the opportunity, would act to make the
output of physicians responsive to consumer desires. Unfortunately, the options open
to medical educators have been narrower than is true in most academic disciplines.
To see what can be done to increase output, it is useful to contrast post- with
pre-MD training. There seems to be a plethora of facilities in the United States
for post-MD training. Approved spaces in hospitals for post-MD training, that is,
training more advanced than medical schools' training, exceed the output of American medical schools by quite a wide margin. As a result, one finds large numbers of
non-American graduates of foreign medical schools taking intern and residency training in this country 5 Despite these imports, many unfilled vacancies exist. Intern

"' Some writers believe that the output of physician services has declined and leisure has replaced work as
real income increased-that is, that the supply of physician services is backward bending. This view has
been seriously considered by Professor Martin Feldstein of Harvard, who has circulated it in a working
paper.

" About 2o0% of all approved internships and residencies in the United States are unfilled despite
the use of foreign-trained physicians in one-third of these positions. See PuBLIC HEALTH SERvIeE, HEALTH
MArNPowER SoUtcEBOO table 28, § 20 (1968).
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and residency programs have never been regarded as difficult to expand. Approved
residencies in hospitals increased six hundred per cent between 194o and i96o, while
the output of medical graduates rose only thirty-five per cent. 0 These advanced programs are under the aegis of hospitals rather than medical schools, although university-affiliated hospitals are overrepresented in post-MD training. It is an anomaly
educationally that, the more advanced the training, the greater is the availability
of facilities and that the more specialized and advanced training often takes place
outside medical schools.
Why should the facilities for post-MD training be disproportionately large relative
to pre-MD training? An explanation of this phenomenon rests on the hypothesis that
there exist economic benefits to the medical profession for post-MD training that are
virtually nonexistent for pre-MD training. The interns and residents of a hospital, the
so-called house staff, are hospital employees, and a large part of their duties
consists of aiding the attending staff in the care of their patients. Despite the time
costs involved in instruction, the attending staff can on balance gain time by delegating duties to the house staff that they would otherwise have to perform for themselves. Hence, doctors that are members of the attending staff of a hospital with
a large intern and residency training program have an important competitive advantage stemming from their lower costs of producing patient care. Needless to say,
the prized positions for attending staffs are in hospitals with extensive intern and
residency training programs. Consequently the staffs of hospitals without educational
programs push hard to obtain such programs. No economic benefit of a comparable
magnitude exists for pre-MD programs. It is true that third- and fourth-year medical
students have some value around a hospital, but they are not worth as much as postMD students. First and second year medical students are a dead weight with respect
to instructional costs and, in the past, have provided no useful output in a hospital.
Indeed, costs of instruction are relatively high for the first two years of medical school
because of small classes and expensive facilities.
The foregoing suggests that the bottleneck in medical education is the first two
years of medical school when, under the Flexner curricula, medical students take
their so-called basic science courses. Serious questions can be raised as to whether or
not these courses ought to be taught in a medical school at all. They are relatively
elementary and are often taught by faculties that are undistinguished when compared with the faculties of biological and physical sciences in many universities.
Indeed many medical students have already completed some of these courses
in their premedical studies and find "ordinary medical school teaching inferior
to the teaching of science in the better undergraduate institutions '37 in addition
to being duplicative and hence a waste of time. It is difficult to understand why
medical schools could not divest themselves of this elementary instruction and con20 R.

S-.RYocK,

supra

note 2, at 91.

" The Crisis in Medical Services and Medical Education, supra note io,at 9.
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centrate in their field of comparative advantage-clinical teaching, both pre- and
post-MD.
If medical schools were to divest themselves of responsibility for precinical teaching
of basic sciences, then (a) the resources of institutions which do not have medical
schools but do have outstanding science departments could play a role in physician
training; (b) the science departments of schools with medical schools could play a
more active role in training doctors; (c) the preclinical years of training could
become part of undergraduate training, thereby shortening the period of production
of doctors by two years and effecting an enormous reduction in the costs of producing MDs; and (d) the resources liberated from training in basic sciences could be
employed to expand the numbers trained by medical schools and to increase the
quality of post-MD training which is now largely outside the province of existing
medical schools and almost wholly didactic.
The important social problem currently is how to make medical schools responsive
to the demands of the market for physicians. One solution is to enlist the aid of the
nonmedical sector of the educational establishment in providing basic science training
and to utilize the resources liberated in medical schools for expansion of enrollments
of third- and fourth-year medical students. However, this is but one suggestion in a
field of education that has been relatively stagnant for many years. Consequently,
one does not have the natural experimentation in educational techniques that otherwise would have been available. An unfortunate heritage of Flexner's work is the
overspecification of how doctors are to be produced. If Flexner had specified what
knowledge and capabilities a physician should have and had given medical educators
the freedom to search for efficient techniques for producing the desired output, we
would currently know a great deal more about how to produce physicians efficiently.
Undoubtedly we would also have many more physicians, because the costs of their
production would be considerably lower and because production would not have
been cut back in the x93os. Medical education has been made artificially expensive
because of the overspecification of how it was to be produced, particularly (but not
exclusively) during the first two years of medical school. 8 As a result, many writers
on the subject explicitly or implicitly accept the view that medical education is
extremely costly, just as if this were a natural constant like the speed of light.
Search for efficiency in medical education could be stimulated by opening state
licensure examinations and/or national boards to all applicants without concern
over how they received their medical education or the rating, if any, of the schools
attended. To insure that this examination is not used by the medical profession as a
barrier to entry, it should bear a reasonable resemblance to the examination that
existing practitioners are asked, from time to time, to pass. Such a move could
88
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increase both the output of physicians and their quality. It could enable the community to move closer to economic efficiency in the production of physicians, since
both quality and quantity could be increased without any change in aggregate
expenditures for the production of physicians.
V
THE AMA

AND HEALTH CARE DELrAvy

Rigidity in medical education has been matched, if not surpassed, by rigidity in
the marketing of medical services. The AMA long ago discovered that fee-for-service
is the ideal way of marketing medical care. Moreover, its confidence in the correctness of this view was so great that any other method of marketing medical care
was opposed actively in order to prevent less intelligent brethren from falling into
error. This opposition took two forms: (a) working for legislation to prohibit alternative methods of marketing medical care, and (b) refusing hospital staff appointments to physicians associated with such unapproved methods.
More specifically the AMA, or organized medicine, opposed bitterly comprehensive prepaid group medical plans such as Kaiser, Ross-Loos, Group Health, and
HIP. Plans of this type are illegal in seventeen, or about one-third, of the statesO9
Where they were legal, they were opposed nevertheless, and the chief weapon used
to fight these plans was to deny access to hospitals for patients of physicians in such
plans. As a consequence the AMA was prosecuted under the Sherman Act in Washington, D.C., and under state antitrust laws elsewhere.40 Physicians without a taste
for martyrdom were deterred from joining such programs, and there is little doubt
that the commitment of organized medicine to fee-for-service has inhibited search
for and experimentation with alternatives to this method of marketing medical care.
Hence, as with medical education, there is less experimental knowledge about the
marketing of medical services than would have been available if organized medicine
were less powerful and there were more freedom to innovate.4 '
Nevertheless, not all prepaid group plans have been aborted, and much can be
learned from those that have been born, and especially from the ones that have survived. One of the most interesting aspects of these plans is the lower frequency of
surgeons (and surgery) than exists in the usual fee-for-service practice. 42
The lower frequency of surgery for prepaid group plan members has been explained as a consequence of differences in economic incentives. In comprehensive pre"Faltermayer, Better Care at Less Cost Without Miracles, FoRrmN, Jan. 197o, at 8o, 127.
o See Kessel, supra note 22, at 36. See also Phelan, Erickson & Fleming, Group Practice Prepayment: An Approach to Delivering Organized Health Services, in this symposium, pt. 2 (forthcoming).
"1 See Forgotson & Cook, Innovations and Experiments in Use of Health Manpower-The Effect of
Icensure Laws, 32 LAw & CoNraMs. PROB. 731 (1967), for a discussion of legal restrictions on the
use of paramedical personnel in the delivery of health care.
' See Donabedian, An Evaluation of Prepaid Group Practice, INQuiRY, Sept. 1969, at 14; Roemer,
On Paying the Doctor and the Implications of Different Methods, J. HEALTH & Soc. BssiAv., Spring 1962,
at 4.
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paid plans, the cost of a marginal unit of surgery (hospitalization and surgical service)
are borne by the plan, with the marginal revenue from this surgery being zero. By
contrast, under fee-for-service the marginal revenue of an additional unit of surgery
to the surgeon is positive, since he receives a surgical fee; hospital costs are borne by
the patient or his insurer. Consequently, it has been argued that some surgery is
performed under fee-for-service that would not have occurred under prepaid medical
care. An alternative interpretation of these same findings is that members of prepaid
plans go outside their plans to buy surgery, foregoing rights to surgery at zero
marginal costs in order to shop at positive marginal costs in the fee-for-service medical
market 3
Another aspect of this problem, which has not been explored in the literature is
that surgeons in comprehensive prepaid plans undertake relatively more surgery
per month or per year than surgeons in fee-for-service. The number of surgical
procedures per surgeon, aggregated by using Blue Cross or Medicare fee schedules
as index numbers, seems to be greater under prepaid medical plans than it is under
fee-for-service. To understand why this should be the case, it is helpful to examine
the anomalous characteristics of the surgical market.
There are virtually no contracts the consumer enters into involving expenditures
as large as those involved in surgical fees in which the price is not carefully specified
and well known to the consumer before the purchase. Yet surgeons' fees are almost
never discussed by patients with their surgeons before operations; one in twenty
would probably be a high estimate of the frequency of patients who know their
surgeon's fee before they commit themselves to surgery.44 This alone suggests that
surgery is not characterized by a high degree of price competition; price wars are
undoubtedly more common in gasoline.
The argument that price competition is absent in surgery does not depend upon
consumer ignorance. The presence of systematic price discrimination in the provision of surgical services is evidence of the absence of price competition,4 5 made
possible by organized medicine's control over access to hospital beds. Comparable
control over fees for office visits does not exist, and consumer knowledge of the prices
for office visits is considerably greater. Consequently the rate of exchange of surgical
for nonsurgical services in the market fails to reflect the rate of exchange in production. Therefore, too many physicians are attracted into surgery, and they are
apt to be underemployed relative to physicians in the nonsurgical specialties.4 a This
misallocation has been aggravated by the onset of Medicare and Medicaid, which
' See Klarman, Effect of Prepaid Group Practice on Hospital Use, 78 PuB. HErLTH REP. 955
"Zero costs" may make this an overstatement of the point, since time costs are neglected.
"If there is a case for state intervention to require a window-sticker for consumers in
cars, then a fortiori there is a case for providing comparable knowledge for the purchasers of
services.
,Kessel, supra note 22, at 29-42.
"8This misallocation is not new. See Bunker, Surgical Manpower in the United States
England and Wales, 282 N. ENG. J. MED. 135, 143 (1970).
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typically have more generous surgical fee schedules than Blue Cross. It is not unknown for patients to be charged surgical fees as much as fifty per cent greater
than the Medicare rate, which is supposed to reflect the prevailing rate in the comcommunity
munity. Medicare has increased the ability of some members of the
7
surgery.
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price
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surgery
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to pay
A great virtue of prepaid group medical plans is that the marginal costs of the
time of surgeons to such plans is lower than it is to the public. The price per surgical
procedure under fee-for-service is regulated; the price of a surgeon's time to a plan
that will convert this time into surgical procedures is not. Hence, prepaid plans
represent a means of cutting prices for surgical services. Alternatively, prepaid plans
constitute means for buying surgical and nonsurgical services at prices that reflect
their relative costs of production.
Many writers have found fault with our medical care delivery system on the
grounds that it is a "cottage industry," characterized by a large number of small
firms that, in their judgment, are operating at less than optimal size. One of the
striking pieces of evidence obtained from our experience with comprehensive prepaid
group medical plans, which are relatively large-scale enterprises, is that advertising
is crucial for getting started and generating sufficient volume to justify attempts to
achieve scale economies. Many of the successful and unsuccessful prepaid plans ran
into trouble with organized medicine because they advertised. Why advertising
should not be permitted has never been made clear, though it is usually roundly
condemned by the AMA as being unethical. It appears that freedom to advertise
4
is important if we want to encourage innovation in the marketing of medical care.
CONCLUSION

In summary, both the production (education) of physicians and the delivery
of health care have suffered from common problems-inability of institutions and
9
individuals to innovate because of the restraints imposed by organized medicine
In the production of physicians, it was a mistake to specify how physicians were to
be produced instead of specifying what the product should be and allowing schools
to compete in efficiently producing that product. State licensure examinations or
"T It is not a complete surprise to find that unfilled vacancies in the surgical residencies are generally
smaller than they are in the nonsurgical specialties. See AMA, DsaEcToxtY or APPRovED INTERNsmPs AND
RESIDENCIES, x968-69, at 8, 9. The over-all percentage filled is 81%. For thoracic surgery, it is 9i%;
surgery, 89%; plastic surgery, 87%; colon and rectal surgery, 92%; neurologic surgery, g9%. By contrast, general practice is 48% filled, pathology 56%, and psychiatry 76%.
11Kessel, supra note 22, at 36.
" There exist many parallels between medicine and AFL building trade unions--discrimination in
admissions, training techniques that are over-specified and excessively protracted, and archaic work rules.
There has been great public dissatisfaction with the performance of both. In the case of the building
trades, this dissatisfaction has led to measures that increase the demand for housing (FHA and VA
loans); for medicine, it has been instrumental in bringing about Medicare and Medicaid. Public intervention has thus far served the interests of these monopolists. In neither field has a frontal attack been
made on the basic problem-restriction on the supply of crucial agents of production.
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the national board examinations constitute an appropriate vehicle for specifying what
physicians can be expected to do. Medical schools should be free to decide how to
produce whatever it is that constitutes a physician without intervention by the state
or the AMA.
Similarly, in the case of medical care delivery, individuals and groups should be
free to innovate alternative delivery systems. There is no case for sanctifying feefor-service and making prepaid plans illegal. Nor is there any good reason for prohibiting advertising by physicians.
In the decade of the x96os, and particularly in the last five years, the AMA began
openly to admit that a "doctor shortage" exists. Many new medical schools have been
started, restrictions on the use of paramedical personnel have been relaxed, and
some innovations in the medical curricula have occurred that have reduced the time
it takes to produce an MD. This behavior is subject to two interpretations-either
the AMA has changed its spots or the times are embarrassingly good financially for
the medical profession and hence a more relaxed attitude is appropriate. This
history of the AMA suggests that the latter interpretation is more correct. During the prosperity of the late g2os, the AMA was less restrictive than it was
during the great depression. 0 It is important to remember that, whatever the
times, the AMA has an inevitable conflict of interests. It has presumed simultaneously to represent (i) the public, in maintaining standards for the production
of physicians and in determining the quantity to be produced, and (2)the medical
profession, the purveyors of medical services. In other words, the AMA represents both the buyers and the sellers of physician services in determining the output
of physicians. Given this anomalous position, it is difficult to believe that the AMA
will ever permit the number of physicians to be produced that the public is willing
to support with its patronage.5 Consequently its power to determine output via
the rating of medical schools should be withdrawn and graduation from an AMAapproved medical school should not be a condition for admission to licensure
2
examinations
It is important to remember that physicians, not Congressmen, produce medical
care. An extension of Medicare to include everyone would increase the demand
for medical care and probably reduce the availability of physicians. The problem that
exists in medicine is largely a consequence of the severe restriction in the output of
"°In the 1930s there was a "little" Flexner report on medical education known as the Weiskotten
Survey, which found that some schools had become lax in their standards and admitted too many

students. See Dodds, supra note 8, at 790.
51 "It must be recognized, however, that it is not likely that America will ever be able to produce
all the physicians the nation would like to have." L. COCOaSFIALL, PLANNING FOR MEDICAL PROoRESS
THROUGH EDUCATION 26, 98 (1965). Coggeshall goes on to argue that it is uneconomic to have the
public's desire satisfied.
" Inpart this has already occurred with respect to graduates of schools other than the Canadian and
American institutions-the graduates of the so-called foreign medical schools. The AMA did rate these
schools at one time. See MARGOLIES & BLOCK, supra note 4,at 46.
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physicians that was caused by the AMA and abetted, probably unwittingly, by
Flexner and the Carnegie Foundation. Hence, the solution to our medical problems
lies in increasing the output of physicians, in making the number of physicians in
the community responsive to the desires of the community. To accomplish this goal,
the AMA should be stripped of its power to control the output of physicians.

